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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n As DI caseloads rise, one relevant
policy question is whether more
targeted screening can reduce costs
without imposing substantial health
consequences.
n We find that looser DI screening
regulations lead acutely injured
workers aged 55–62 to claim DI and
permanently leave the labor force.
n In contrast, implementing more
stringent DI application criteria does
not significantly increase mental or
physical health costs for screened out
workers.
n More targeted DI programs can
have large fiscal savings without
harming workers.

D
isability insurance (DI) is a public expenditure (or social insurance) program
designed to provide income to individuals who become incapable of working due to

health conditions, ofen a workplace injury. Depending on the income replacement
rate, DI can provide incentives against work and can efectively serve as a form of
early retirement. Moreover, DI costs and caseloads have been increasing in recent
years, leading governments to consider alternative payment schemes and/or additional
restrictions.
Although more efective gatekeeping can lower DI rolls and reduce fnancial burdens,
the costs to workers themselves may be large. For example, stricter DI screening rules
would be harmful to workers if rejected applicants are forced to return to work but
experience lifelong mental or physical health problems as a result. On the other hand,
if more stringent criteria for claiming DI induces workers “on the margin” to continue
working without sufering any negative health consequences, applicants who are screened
out of eligibility would continue to earn income.
To study these trade-ofs of stricter DI screening directly, we use newly linked
administrative data in Austria to evaluate whether changing age-based DI screening
requirements for older workers afects their labor market outcomes, health, and wellbeing. While it is well documented that DI can afect employment, we know relatively
little about how DI regulation afects health in the short or long run.
We provide three new fndings: First, we show that looser screening regulations
subsidize retirement by inducing injured workers to claim DI and permanently leave
the labor force. Next, we show that individuals denied DI do not change their take-up of
other types of safety net program participation, such as unemployment insurance and
sick leave. Lastly, and most importantly, we show that being denied DI does not lead to
measurable changes in mental or physical health. Specifcally, screened-out workers are
no more likely to use opioids or antidepressant prescriptions, and they do not experience
additional hospital stays or physician fees. Tese workers are also no more likely to
experience a workplace reinjury. Governments looking to reduce DI fnancial burdens
can thus consider tightening the screening for eligibility to curb costs without imposing
signifcant physical or mental harm to marginal applicants.

Efects of Increased DI Screening on Labor Market Outcomes
For additional details, see the full working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/22-375/.

Our goal is to measure how more-targeted DI programs afect worker employment
and health outcomes. However, because DI is a program that individuals can opt into and
is based on health assessments from a doctor, workers claiming DI and those unable to
claim DI are likely diferent on many dimensions, like age or health status. Terefore, to
get a sense of the causal efects of changes in DI screening, we use a natural experiment
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We fnd that stronger
DI screening increases
employment by 20.0
percentage points in
the 12 quarters afer a
workplace accident—
this corresponds in our
sample to an additional
470 workers staying in the
labor market who would
have otherwise retired
within three years.

that allows us to defne treatment and control cohorts to test the diferences of increased
DI screening.
To compare otherwise similar workers who face diferent levels of DI screening, we
exploit changes in the Austrian Generous Screening Age (GSA) over time. For younger
workers below the GSA, screening for DI is relatively strict, requiring a 50 percent
reduced earnings capacity relative to any occupation the individual could pursue. At the
GSA, the screening criteria are more relaxed, requiring a 50 percent reduced earnings
capacity relative to the individual’s last occupation. Until the end of 2012, the GSA was
57. However, in 2013, as part of the Stability Act, or Stabilitätsgesetz, Austria reformed
these age-based screening requirements, slowly increasing the GSA from 57 to 60 over
three years, making it more difcult for older workers to access DI benefts.
We focus on the subset of applicants at most immediate need of DI: acutely injured
workers. We analyze efects of the change in DI screening for male workers aged 55–62,
comparing same-age workers who experienced a workplace accident between 2000 and
2017. Workplace accidents represent an unexpected acute health care shock to workers
and result in DI claims approximately 20 percent of the time.
We separate workers into two groups: those subject to a “tight” (more restrictive)
screening requirement afer injury and those subject to relaxed screening, according to
the GSA rule and the worker’s age at the time of the accident. We fnd that afer a worker
experiences an accident, DI claims increase in both groups. However, the increase in DI
claims is markedly smaller for workers who qualify for stricter screening. In particular,
we fnd that stricter DI application screening leads to a 7.8 percentage point decrease in
DI take-up, on average. We show that this decrease is not due to workers waiting until
they are older to claim DI or experiencing more accidents once they are past the GSA
cutof.
In Figure 1 we perform the same exercise for the probability of being employed. Prior
to a workplace accident, the trends in employment for the workers subject to tight versus
generous DI screening overlap. Afer the accident, workers in both groups are more likely
to leave the labor market. However, the outfow is much weaker among those who are
subject to stricter DI screening.
Figure 1 Efects of Increased DI Screening on the Probability of Being Employed
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NOTE: The sample includes all male workers that have a work accident aged 55–62 between 2000 and
2017, N = 6,394. The fgure plots raw probabilities for each quarter relative to the work accident.
SOURCE: Individual-level data on workplace accidents is from the Austrian General Accident Insurance
Fund. Data on DI enrollment and labor market participation and wages for Austrian workers is from the
Austrian Social Security Database fles.
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When we formally estimate the causal impact of tighter screening laws by comparing
workers based on their screening level prior to and afer the workplace accident, we fnd
that stronger DI screening increases employment by 20.0 percentage points in the 12
quarters afer a workplace accident—this corresponds in our sample to an additional 470
workers staying in the labor market who otherwise would have retired within three years.
Notably, this is almost identical to the magnitude for the take-up in DI. Tis reduction
in DI participation does not simply spill over to other government programs; we fnd
that workers subject to stricter DI screening are no more likely to claim unemployment
insurance in the frst two years afer injury.
Additionally, we show that prior to a work accident, workers facing both tight and
relaxed screening criteria have similar levels of daily wages (approximately 90 euros
per day). However, our estimates indicate that workers facing stricter DI screening are
not only more likely to reenter the workforce, but they also experience higher earnings
trajectories and earn approximately 2,075 more euros per year, on average.

Efects of Increased DI Screening on Worker Health Outcomes
Next, we analyze the broader efects of increasing DI screening. Specifcally, we test
whether screening out more workers afects short- or long-run physical and mental
health outcomes. We fnd that the number of days spent in the hospital for workers
facing tight screening and those facing generous screening almost perfectly overlap, both
prior to and afer a workplace accident. In the quarter of the accident, hospital days spike,
suggesting that the accident leads to around a week-long hospital stay on average for both
groups. Afer the accident, the trends converge again. (Formally, we fnd that tighter DI
screening leads to a small, economically insignifcant 0.2 day increase in average hospital
stays.)
Furthermore, to examine whether increased screening forces workers to return to
work without a full recovery, we analyze two other measures of health care utilization:
fees paid to physicians and reinjury. Figure 2 presents the trends in injury for the two
groups before and afer a workplace accident and mirrors the trends for other health
Figure 2 Efects of Increased DI Screening on the Probability of Reinjury
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We fnd no diferential
efects on physician fees
or reinjury, implying
that screened out
workers are no more
likely to experience
further negative health
consequences when
returning to work.
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NOTE: The sample includes all Upper Austrian male workers who have a work accident aged 55–62 between
2000 and 2017 (N = 645). The fgure plots raw probabilities for each quarter relative to the work accident.
SOURCE: Individual-level data on workplace accidents is from the Austrian General Accident Insurance Fund.
Data on DI enrollment and labor market participation and wages for Austrian workers is from the Austrian
Social Security Database fles.
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Based on our estimates,
tightening the screening
standards for DI has fscal
benefts with minimal
health and labor market
consequences for the
marginal worker.

outcomes that we observe. We fnd no diferential efects on physician fees or reinjury,
implying that workers screened out of DI are no more likely to experience further
negative physical health consequences when returning to work.
To test for efects on mental health, such as stress or depression, we analyze changes in
prescription take-up for antidepressants and antidementia drugs. We fnd no statistically
signifcant efects for either measure. Tese fndings further reinforce the notion that, for
marginal applicants, DI subsidizes retirement but yields little to no health benefts.

Measuring Welfare Efects
Taking the above fndings into consideration, we ask whether the social benefts of the
changes in DI screening outweigh the costs. Consider what would happen if the stricter
screening were not implemented, and more workers instead were able to claim DI.
Using our estimates, we calculate the benefts of being subject to a less-strict eligibility
criteria, including any gained income and health efects for the marginal workers. We
then consider the direct government costs of looser DI screening, including forgone tax
revenue.
We fnd that only 20 percent of male workers aged 55–62 injured on the job claim
DI within three years of injury, corresponding to approximately 4,700 workers. To
estimate direct impacts to worker well-being, we consider how DI take-up changes
income. Because DI has, on average, a 70 percent replacement rate aggregating foregone
income across these 4,700 workers implies that, in total, workers are willing to trade
approximately nearly 1 million euros per year for reduced DI screening. Because the
change in screening does not afect health outcomes or unemployment insurance receipt,
workers do not directly beneft on these dimensions.
Next, we calculate the net DI cost per recipient for workers near the margin. Workers
eligible for DI remain on the program as a form of retirement. We estimate that workers
claiming DI afer an on-the-job injury receive an average payment of nearly 17,000 euros
annually. Terefore, the mechanical reduction in costs for increasing DI screening equals
about 2.6 million euros per year (17,000 euros × 470 cases / three years). Furthermore,
when workers receive DI and leave their job, the government loses tax revenue. Assuming
the lowest marginal tax rate bracket in Austria of 20 percent, and the average wage in
our sample of about 24,000 euros, we should expect that the government will give up an
average of 750,000 euros each year in tax revenue from more generous DI screening.

Conclusion
We fnd that, in Austria, tightening the screening standards for DI provides fscal
benefts with minimal health and labor market consequences for the marginal worker.
If such a policy were to be targeted to younger and/or healthier workers who would be
expected to continue to work for many more years, welfare gains would be even larger.
We note that the implicit price of providing DI benefts to applicants, in terms of impacts
on the labor market, has been shown to be larger in Austria than in the United States.
Tis is mostly due to the fact that DI in the United States is ofen seen as a program
that can serve as a substitute to unemployment insurance or other non-health shocks.
Terefore, our fndings may be most relevant for countries with relatively large social
safety nets. Nonetheless, the conclusions from our analysis are generally relevant for
governments (like the United States) that still rely on age-based DI policies. Overall,
these fndings are especially relevant for governments looking to reduce the rising fscal
costs of disability payments without inducing lifelong health consequences for workers.
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